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Emerging country MNEs and the role of home countries: separating fact from 
irrational expectations 
 
Abstract: This paper takes a look at the research on Emerging country multinational enterprises (EMNEs) over 
the last 25 years, and argues that growth in EMNE activity over the last 10 years continues to be dominated by 
Asian Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), an d to a lesser extent by Brazil, Ru ssia, India and China (the 
BRICS). Instead of focusing on the success stories, we ask: Why have so many emerging home countries failed to 
fulfil their potential as sig nificant outward investors, and converged (at least) with  the NICs? Many of the 
EMNEs from the non-NICs continue to reflect limited O advantages, and unless they are able to upgrade their 
firm-specific assets, this trend is likely to continue. We propose that – in line with extant IB theory - the extent 
and intensity of EMNE activity is a function of their O advantages, which in turn are largely a function of their 
home country L advantages. We also call into question the soundness of the idea that EMNEs are able to utilise 
asset-seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) to build up their O advantages. Such asset-augmentation presumes 
that the firms have non-location-bound firm-specific assets that have the potential to be upgraded and 
augmented.  
Key words: FDI, MNEs, eclectic paradigm , asset-seeking, knowledge flows, em erging 
markets. 
JEL codes: F23, L52, O14, O19 
Introduction 
Academic research – like all hum an endeavour – dem onstrates a waxing and w aning of 
interest in particul ar subjects. The em erging country MNE (EMNE) enjoyed a sporadic 
popularity as a subject f or serious research from  the late 1970s till the early 1990s, before  
returning to obscurity. E xpectations at the tim e were high of this ‘new’ f orm of activity. To 
quote a UN report (1993: 1) on the potential impact of EMNEs:  
“To host developing countries, the emergence of a new source of capital, technology and 
skills is a welcome development…to host developed countries, the rise of developing country 
TNCs carries mixed implications. Increased competition and the search for new technology 
in developed countries may be perceived as costs; the inflow of capital and skills and the 
prospects for expanded cooperation in third countries may be seen as benefits”.  
Renewed interest has again been sparked since the dawn of the new millennium, and similar 
hopes and aspiration s are once again placed  on the e mergence of the EMNE.  Many 
discussions in these early studi es were concentrated on EMNE activity from the Asian NICs 
(Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong) as well as India, China, Brazil and a few others. 
Moving 20 years ahead, the discussion still centres around these same home countries (‘...the 
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TNCs in the developing world are highly concentrated in a h andful of the m ore 
industrialized, relatively better-off c ountries..’ ibid) with many of the s ame firms, and with 
similar questions about their ‘ unique’ motivations and characteris tics. True, the s cale and 
scope of the EMNE activity m ay have changed along with the socio- political and economic 
milieu in which they operate. However, as this paper will argue, the differences between this 
incarnation and the previous one should not be overestimated.  
There is always a danger in social science research to generalise from outliers and anecdotes 
and to of fer new theore tical insight from such evidence. This pape r takes a  look at th e 
evidence and argues th at the ‘spurt’ in EMNE activity continues to b e dominated by the 
Asian NICs, and to a lesser extent by the BRICS. Indeed, it is curious that the NICs continue 
to be regarded as emerging econ omies, having moved – on alm ost any indicator of 
development and competitiveness – to convergence with the developed world. Likewise their 
MNEs are increasingly indistinguishable in  their strategic behaviour and econom ic 
organisation from ‘conventional’ MNEs.   
Herein lies the basic principle upon this paper is based: the upgrading of NICs ’ home 
economies (including associated location advant ages) helps create com petitive firms which 
start to internationalise their operations due to both push and pull factors.  The m eans and 
pattern by which these EMNEs sought to utilise and upgrade their firm -specific advantages 
lies at th e heart of all firm s’ global expansion. In short, th e MNEs from the NICs have 
fulfilled the expectations suggested by the UN report quoted above.  
Others have not. It is equally germ ane to ask – of the other im portant home countries 
identified in the 1980s/1990s – why have so few failed to fulfil their potential, and converged 
(at least) with the NICs?  Why have other countr ies not joined this august and select group?  
The opportunities for leapfrogging and rapid expa nsion for EMNEs that the NICs were able 
to utilise were equally available to firms from other countries, yet not all have been able to 
utilise them efficiently.  
This paper does two things . First, we revisit theoretical insights from the received literature 
on the causes of firms’ internationalisation activities, paying special interest to the sources of 
firms’ ownership advantages. In particular, we  revisit the principle – espoused in the IB 
literature from at least the tim e of Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle thesis, and possibly 
earlier – that the O advantages of firms are a function of the lo cation (L) advantages of their 
home countries, especially at th e earlier stages of their internationalisation.  Such concepts 
4 
 
have been built into and integrated into later theoretical work, including the eclectic paradigm 
and the Uppsala m odel, as well as the investm ent development path, a mong others. The 
literature on these new MNEs dates back to the late 1970s, and we also revisit how they were 
understood and explained by the mainstream IB literature. We argue here that thes e patterns 
of FDI from developing countries – at both firm  level and country levels – continue to reflect 
these extant conceptual and theoretical models and principles, insofar as they are understood 
and properly applied. 
Second, we examine some of the evidence on E MNE activity. We illustrate that the levels of 
MNE activity from em erging economies countries reflects their econom ic structure, 
absorptive capacity, and business and innovati on systems. We also call into question the 
soundness of the idea th at EMNEs are able to utilise asset-seeking FDI to build up their O 
advantages. Such asset-augmentation presumes that the firms have non-location-bound firm-
specific assets that have the potential to be upgraded and augmented, and which therefore  
allow them to engage in (and control) long-term value-adding activities in f oreign locations 
that are commercially viable. 
 
The emergence of the EMNE: a tale of two waves 
Beginning with Lecraw (1977), the phenom enon of outward FDI by E MNEs was the subject 
of considerable research in the late 1970s a nd early 1980s (see contributions to Lall (ed)  
(1983), Kumar and McLeod (eds) (1981), Khan (ed) (1986)). Much of this research sketched 
a description of a ‘new’ kind of  MNE which – so it was argued – differed considerably from 
that of ‘conventional’ indus trialised country MNEs and wa s more suited to the special 
conditions of developing host eco nomies. This ‘first wave’ lit erature pointed out certain 
characteristics of EMNEs which are summarised  in the first column of table 1. Much of this 
empirical work indicated a strong and m arked trend for EMNEs to focus their investm ents in 
neighbouring and other countries which were at a similar or an earlier stage of development. 
This preference was a direct resu lt of their lack of international experience – these locations 
had offered resource endowm ents for markets which were broadly simila r to those of their 
home countries. Lall (1983), Dunning (1981, 1988)  and Wells (1983) o ffered a theoretical 
justification for these characteri stics. The use of lower, m ature technologies reflected not a  
better understanding of the developing country host m arket conditions, but sim ply that their 
O advantages were outdated, and organisational abilities limited. As s uch, they were only 
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able to generate revenues in sim ilar markets to the host country by leveraging their 
experience in operating in developing m arkets with similar institutions which were of 
marginal interests to conventional MNEs. These O advantages were enhanced by the 
prevalence of import-substituting, inward looking policy regimes amongst most developing 
countries which encouraged sm all scale production, typical of that suited to these EMNEs. 
Import substitution was associated with privil eged access to domestic markets for nationally 
owned firms compared to foreign-owned MNEs . The O advantages of these firm s were 
primarily country-specific, determ ined by th e market distortions introduced by the home  
country policies, and only sustainable at home while these distortions were in place, and were 
only really useful in foreign m arkets where similar distortions existed (and privileged access 
was granted). Dunning (1981, 1988) argued that when countries which engaged in outward 
FDI, this reflected the L advantages of th e home country, and consequently its econom ic 
development.   
***Table 1 about here*** 
While some asset-augmenting1 investment in industrialised countries was undertaken 2, it was 
relatively minor. Many large investments in industrialised countries represented flight capital, 
as entrepreneurs utilised overs eas subsidiaries to circum vent home country restrictions on 
outbound international capital m ovements. In other cases, there was significant ‘round-trip’ 
investment. The case of Hong Kong outward FDI to China is an example of this. The PRC 
accounted for almost half of Hong Kong total outward FDI stock in 1993, and 66% of total 
inward stock in China. Chen (1983) estim ated that just over 50% of  outward FDI from Hong 
Kong was by affiliates of convent ional MNEs in 1981. Later, a large share of th is round-
tripping came from Taiwan (van Hoesel 1999).  The use of overseas subsidiaries as a m eans 
to channel foreign capital was not lim ited to conventional MNEs. Harrold and Lall (1993) 
point out that up to 25 % of China’s inflows represented re -investment of capital by Chinese 
MNEs based in Hong Kong (and are therefore recorded as outflows from Hong Kong). 
The first wave EMNEs were concentrated from 15 countries, which accounted for 81% of all 
outward FDI from developing countries in 198 0. The most prominent home countries were 
Brazil and Argentina w ith 13.4% and 20.4% resp ectively of outward FDI stock from  these 
countries, followed by the Asian NICs (K orea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong) which 
                                                 
1 We will use the term ‘asset-augmentation’ in preference to ‘asset-seeking’ throughout this paper. 
2 See Table 9.11 and Table 10.14 in Tolentino (1993) for a description of several such investments.   
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together accounted for alm ost 22% of all EM NE activity3, with other significant players 
being Malaysia, Brazil, Argen tina, India and China (Dunning et  al 1998). In 1980, China, 
Mexico and Brazil invested more than 50% of their stock in the developed countries, with the 
rest concentrating their activit ies in developing countries. As  of the m id 1980s, this ‘first 
wave’ MNE was clearly distinct from the ‘conventional’ MNE. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, several resear chers (e.g., Tolentino 1993, UN 1993) began to 
observe a change in th e investment activity. There was in creasing evidence that there had 
been a fundam ental shift in both the character and m otivation of m uch outward FDI from  
certain developing countries, which we label in table 1 as the “second w ave” (Dunning et al 
1998). This second wave of EMNE activity sh owed a growing tendency to sim ultaneously 
invest in industrialised countries in m arketing-seeking, asset-exploiting activities and a 
limited amount of asset-augmenting activities, as well as in developing countries to acquire 
natural assets as in the first wave. Not all count ries that were prominent investors in the first  
wave proceeded into the second wave. Prom inent first-wave home countries such as India, 
Philippines, Argentina and Colombia did not show any significant increase in either the level 
of the total outward FDI between  the early 1980’s and 1990’s, nor  a significant shift towards 
developed country hosts, while firms from Korea, Taiwan, China, Singapore and Hong Kong 
began to act as second wave (Dunning et al  1998). Table 2 lists the 20 largest outward 
investors in 1993. The Asian NICs  led this process, reflecti ng the dynamism of their hom e 
economies and the competitiveness of their firms. Indeed, the Asian NICs as a share of all  
developing country outward FDI stock increased from 21% to 66% by 1993.  
***Table 1 about here*** 
It seems reasonable to ask: w hy did the second wave com e about? What led to what seem ed 
to be a fun damental change in MNE activity? We posit that the cir cumstances behind this 
shift are due to a gradual and incremental evo lution of these MNEs, as explained by received 
IB literature in the m echanism by which the  O advanta ges EMNEs inte ract with the L 
advantages of their hom e countries to de termine the process of internationalisation. 
Nonetheless, important exogenous developm ents due to globalisation have also acted as 
important catalysts in this process.  
 
                                                 
3 With Singapore being the single largest outward investor from this group in 1980. 
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The dynamics of O advantages: how home countries shape MNE internationalisation. 
Much of extant IB theory builds around evolut ionary ideas and principles, from  the Uppsala 
model to the technological and knowledge accumulation of MNEs and the investm ent 
development path4, and all subscribe to the tendency fo r firms and countries to evolve both 
their competitive assets and the geographical distribution and intensity of their foreign-based 
activities – f or the m ost part – inc rementally. The concepts behind the first wave/second 
wave/conventional MNE (or indeed the in fant/adolescent/mature MNE process) are  
essentially evolutionary and indicate a similar propensity for firms to respond to opportunities 
and challenges incrementally.  
The early IB literature was built around the speci fic question of explaining why certain fir ms 
internationalise their operations. At the risk  of oversimplification, the root cause of 
internationalisation lies in the possession of ow nership advantages as or iginally proposed by 
Hymer (1966) and his descriptio n of ownership advantages as  a net cost advantage of  
foreign-owned over indigenous firm s in the re levant local m arket (Cantwell and Narula 
2001).  However, this view of O a dvantages reflects a pre-globalisation world where MNEs  
played a much more marginal role in indi vidual economies. Increasingly, O advantages are 
seen in relation to the in ternational competition mainly from other MNEs rather than relative 
to domestic companies in a particular host country.  Even though certain critics have 
proposed that these may not be necessary where firm s engage in asset-augm enting activity 
(e.g., Mathews 2006), firms still require some kinds of O advantages with which to engage in 
such activities. MNEs that are not world lead ers or do not hold an overall absolute cost 
advantage over most indigenous firms in the countries in which they invest still need to have 
ownership advantages especially in operating in  certain differentiated kinds of environm ent; 
some of them have bee n able to upgrade thes e advantages m ore rapidly than in the past, 
encouraging and facilitating a faster internationalisation (Cantwell and Narula 2001).  
Asset-augmentation requires a complementarity between the initial O advantages of the firm 
and its ability to later consolidate and ex tend these advantages through its network of 
subsidiaries. MNEs with greate r initial ownership advantages also have a greater absorptive  
capacity needed to benefit fr om the potential for new inn ovation to be found in foreign 
locations. This begs the question – when exam ining the case of firms that initia lly seek to 
internationalise their activities – where do these initial ownership advantages arise from?    
                                                 
4 See variously Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 2009), Cantwell (1989), Narula (1996), Narula and Dunning (2010)  
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It is worth stating that O advantages derive from two types of firm-specific assets:  
1. Those associated with techno logical assets in th e traditional sense of 
technological/engineering, such as m achinery and equipm ent, and in the personnel who 
operate and maintain them. These are asset-type ownership (Oa) advantages.  
2. The second type of firm -specific assets are those associated with conducting 
transactions efficiently, that derive from  being able to generate rent by virtue of superior use 
of intra-firm hierarchies, both within and across na tional borders. In addition there are those 
that derive by virtue of  the multinationality of the f irms and can be term ed ‘advantages of 
common governance’. These are transaction-type ownership (O t) advantages (see Dunning 
1993, Cantwell and Narula 2001).  
It is important to note that firms can exist in  the absence of Oa adva ntages, generating rent 
simply from its superior knowledge of m arkets and hierarchies, inter alia through the astute 
use of arbitrage.  Indeed, entr epreneurial ability is a primary firm-specific Ot advantage (Yiu 
et al 2007). But entrepreneursh ip advantages are not only ab out identifying new opportunity 
for rent generation, and the abi lity to bear the associated ri sk, but also the capacity to 
coordinate activities associated with such opportunities. Howe ver, they can be seen as  a 
complementary set of assets, rather than a subs titute for Oa advantages (Cantwell and Narula 
2001).  
O advantages m ost commonly derive in the fi rst instance from internalising or gaining 
privileged access to assets that are location-specific, typically defined as location advantages. 
These are also often country-specific, and at a ny given point t, these L advantages influence 
the kind of O advantages firm s possess. Ta ke the case of a less developed econom y. Two 
types of initial O advantages may arise. The first type are location-bound O advantages which 
may allow the firm  be able to generate prof its from these assets but only in a specific 
location. This m ay be due to government-induced incentives, such as pr ivileged access to 
specific natural resources, to capital, or specific infrastru cture. In other cases, m arket entry 
may be restricted providing the firm with a monopoly or a pseudo-monopoly, and consequent 
opportunities to generate rent (e.g., telecoms licenses, petroleum drilling rights).   
Location-bound O advantages may also derive from specific (non-government) L advantages 
which the firm is able to access only in the given location, the use of which requires physical 
presence in that specific location.  Many EMNEs are amongs t the largest in their hom e 
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markets, and are them selves part of large i ndustrial groups (sometimes with cross-holdings  
and common ownership) with interests in seve ral industries, and also derive location-bound 
O advantages from  privileged access to intr a-group transactions and interm ediate goods 
within the same family of firms, but these advantages are not necessarily available when they 
move abroad5.  These m ay also derive from  knowledge of institutio ns, and by being an  
‘insider’. By virtue of their size and importance in the home economy, they m ay have close 
relationships with state-owned organisations, ministries and po licy makers, and are able to 
influence domestic policy, as well  as the associated technology and science infrastructure to 
their own needs, and in m any cases, these have evolved around and with their own dom estic 
activities, often over a long period of ti me. Such linkages confer the basis to generate 
economic rent for incumbents, and are a cost to new entrants or those less entrenched in the 
domestic milieu. These advantages are not tr ansferable to foreign markets, and establishing 
‘membership’ in business and innovation ne tworks in new locations is not costless6 (Narula 
2002). Location-bound O advantages tend to provide limited opportunities to internationalise, 
except through exports. Most of ten early stage, infant EMNE s engage in resource-seeking 
activity, driven by the need to acquire important scarce inputs abroad that are not as cheaply 
available through the market. Given that thei r home economies are often largely dependent 
upon the primary sector, their FDI is also similarly focused. Such resource-seeking activity is 
often undertaken by large state-owned firms. 
The second type of O a dvantages are fi rm-specific (and therefore non location-bound ) and 
derive from skills, technology or other knowle dge which the firm possesses to the exclusion 
of other economic actors operating in the same location.  Such O advantages also tend to be a  
function of the hom e country. Firms typically bu ild their original res ource endowments in 
their home country and this original resource endowment drives their international growth 
(Tan and Meyer, 2010)  
As such, infant/first wave EMNEs undertake very little market-seeking activity. Where firms 
possess firm-specific O advantages to do so, th ese are relatively bas ic, because they are a 
function of the home country conditions, and te nd to reflect its technological and absorptive 
capacity (which in itself  is ref lected in its stage of developm ent) (Criscuolo and Narula 
                                                 
5 However, where other members of the same domestic networks (even in the absence of f ormal ties) have 
international operations, their knowledge and competences of foreign activities positively influence 
internationalisation (Yiu et al 2007, Elango and Pattnaik 2007). 
6 At the sam e time, not all DC MNEs  have privileged access to t hese networks, particularly those that are  
smaller, and/or start-ups. For such firms, outward FDI may also be a means to exit institutional constraints at 
home (Witt and Lewin 2007) 
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2008). In general, such Oa advantages are modest, and do not refl ect significant Ot 
advantages either. As such, internationalisation tends to remain modest. The O advantages of 
these firms remain country-specific, and only su stainable where similar conditions exist, or 
where similar L advantages perm it their survival. As we have discussed in the last section, 
first wave EMNEs directed a m ajority of the outward FDI towards other developing 
countries, most often neighbourin g countries. Such ‘infant MN Es’, consistent with the 
predictions of the Uppsala m odel (Johansson and Vahlne 2009), and tend to locate where 
cultural, political and so cial conditions are most similar to their hom e countries, and where 
competitors with superior O advantages are unlikely to venture. For EMNEs, this has m eant 
other emerging economies (Pananond and Za ithaml, 1998). In summ ary, emerging home 
countries whose L advantages are modest tend  to sprout E MNEs whose O advantages are 
equally modest. A large literature has shown that the firms of each country tend to embark on 
a path of technological accumulation that has certain unique characteristics and that sustains a 
distinct profile of national technological specialisation (Cantwell 1989). 
Infant EMNEs may undertake some asset-augmenting investment but in order to do so they 
must have well-developed Ot adva ntages. It is  possible that the lack of Oa advantages  can 
partly be offset by superior Ot advantages, and used to develop a nd acquire technological 
assets. There are two challeng es that arise. First, superior Ot advantages are difficult to 
acquire rapidly, are tacit and not readily transferable, and are dependent upon experience and 
learning-by-doing. Acquiring thes e abroad and transferring th em for use elsewhere in the 
MNE is a reverse knowledge flow that itself requires very specific organisational skills which 
few firms possess, even among the most advanced MNEs (Criscuolo et al 2005, Tallman and 
Chacar, 2011).  In gen eral, building up O advantages  requires complex linkages, both of 
networks internal to the firm, and those between external networks and internal networks, and 
require complex coordination if they are to provide optimal benefits (Narula and Zanfei 
2005). Such networks are not only difficult to manage, but also require considerable 
resources (both m anagerial and financial).  Nonetheless, the use of non-equity and equity 
partnerships and networks is by no means a ‘new’ and unique feature of the EMNE: the early 
literature on Japanese MNEs em phasised the advantages they derived from  the keiretsu. 
Indeed, the global production netw ork may be said to be a natural evolution of the keiretsu 
model.   
It is im portant to highlight the im portance of hom e country networks. Em beddedness in a 
location provides membership to a ‘club’ of complex relationships with suppliers, custom ers 
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and knowledge infrastructure thro ugh formal and informal institutions that have taken years 
to evolve a stock of knowledge that is only ava ilable to members by virtue of their constant  
interaction. There are ‘goods’ associated with these networks that are on ly available to those 
that are collocated, because they  have evolved under the sam e informal institutions. Thus 
they are sem i-public goods, for which firm s located there have invested in to acquire 
knowledge of these institutions.  Such home country networks m ay include other dom estic 
EMNEs, as well as so me of the (em bedded) foreign M NEs located there wh ose own 
experience in foreign m arkets and networks  abroad m ay be access ible to new  EMNEs 
venturing into international markets (e.g., Elango and Pattnaik 2007, Yiu et al 2007). Bot h 
Luo and Tung (2007) and Mathews (2006) focus on the linkages, opportunities and m arket 
knowledge potentially available by being part of a global value chain that can be leveraged to 
expand abroad. This is indeed a potentially useful  and important source of Ot advantages, but 
ultimately depends upon the extent to which the do mestic firm is integrated with the foreign 
firms, and t he foreign firm ’s strategy. Beside s, this provides a tem porary and ultim ately 
unsustainable Ot advantage unless developed. B esides, such linkages can m ake firms ‘lazy’: 
Hemrit’s (2011) study found that Thai business gr oups with strong ties to foreign MNEs at 
home tend to m ake less effort to develop fi rm-specific advantages to exploit abroad. 
Nonetheless, participating in allia nces and networks w ith large MNE does provide 
opportunities to upgrade Oa advantages. As  Athreye and Cantwell (2007) note, 
subcontractors or subsidiaries  in emerging econom ies can u pgrade their value creation by 
moving from assembly closer towards R&D and discovery or  product design and branding. 
Through knowledge spillovers in the international network, by repositioning their activities 
they can intensify the knowledge-b ased interactions associated with innovation. But this is a 
phenomenon more closely associated with fi rms with strong existing Oa advantages, and 
therefore second wave EMNEs. The popular expl anation – that certain countries are m ore 
entrepreneurial than others – discounts the fact that there are im portant difference between 
individual entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship.  
Reverse knowledge flows are often discussed in  the context of asset-augmentation. Although 
asset-augmentation is a challenging task and EMNEs are rarely equipped with the capacity to 
undertake these efficiently at th e infant MNE stage, neverthele ss, some infant EMNE asset-
seeking activity m ay take place ou t of necessi ty, e.g., where strategic reasons m ake direct 
ownership of foreign assets is essential. This is especially so in th e service based industries, 
where firms a physical foreign presence is essential.  It is worth noting that FDI in services is 
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a relatively new phenomenon, and has largely been made possible by a variety of agreements 
associated with the WTO that have com e into force since the beginning of the 21 th century. 
Some of these investm ents are ‘s trategic’ in the sense that banks and insurance co mpanies 
need to maintain overseas operations in financial centers such as New York and London, and 
be capitalized or at least be reg istered as having a legal presence in those locations. Yet 
others require a physical presence to be in proxim ity to clients.   The extent to which such 
asset-seeking investments benefit home-country operations depends upon the extent to which 
the MNE h as the absorptive capacity and Ot adva ntages to do so, and whether it seeks to 
evolve into a global integrat ed enterprise, or maintain its foreign operations as de facto free-
standing enterprises with weak links to the parent company (Meyer et al 2011).  
Such infant or first wave MNEs are not exclusively a phenomenon of emerging economies. 
Such patterns of early internationalisation ar e independent of nationa lity, or developm ent 
stage of the hom e country, and sim ilar behaviour has b een noted of firm s from almost all 
home countries. That is, lim ited Ot advantages and a preference to locate in m arkets which 
are broadly similar to the home country. On the other hand, in the case the Oa advantages of 
infant MNEs from developed markets are likely to reflect the much higher L advantages of  
these countries.  Indeed, what we have referred to as ‘conv entional’ MNEs often began in 
much the same way.  
Second wave – or to use Ram amurti’s terminology – ‘adolescent’ MN Es, indicate better 
developed O advantages, of both types. That is, the scale and scope of their Oa and Ot  
advantages is greater. This reflects im provements that derive from  greater experience and  
learning by virtue of ongoing foreign operations, th eir own internal firm-specific investments 
in R&D, the L advantages of the hom e country, and (to a lesser ex tent, depending upon the 
scope and competence of their foreign o perations and the extent of their foreign 
embeddedness) the L advantages of the host country(ies) (Meyer et al 2011).  T he home 
country remains – even for the m ost advanced MNEs – the prim ary location for R&D 
activities. Thus, where the L advantages do not provide the necessary knowledge and  
advanced infrastructure to s upport asset-upgrading, these firm s are unlikely to evolve into 
second wave/adolescent MNEs. The  complexity of managing internationally dispersed R&D 
acts as a centrip etal force on firm s’ Oa a dvantage upgrading efforts, and accounts for a 
tendency of firms to locate the most strategically significant aspects of their activities closer 
to home.  Therefore, O advantages of m ost MNEs – and particularly for MNEs at an early 
stage of internationalisation such as  EMNEs - continue to be determ ined to a very large 
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extent by the innovation system  of the home country. Furthermore, where the home country 
does not possess a minimum threshold of scientific and technological capability, MNEs from 
these locations are like ly to rem ain first wave/infant MNEs with Oa and Ot assets that 
concentrate in natu ral resource-intensive, primary sector ac tivities and only m inimally in 
market-seeking knowledge intensive manufacturing and services, primarily in less developed 
countries. More recently, Aulakh (2007) and Cu ervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) has alluded to 
the advantages derived from  operating in sim ilar institutional conditions which are 
predominated by com plex, informal institutions which create greater uncertainty , or as 
Khanna and Palepu (2006) put it, institu tional ‘voids’. That is, em erging country MNEs – 
such as those from China, India and  South Africa - are able to discoun t the greater risk of 
operating in such environm ents because they ha ve more experience – ei ther at home or in 
other similar countries – which provides th em a location-specific O advantages not 
necessarily available to investors from developed countries. Del Sol and Kogan (2007) point 
to the ownership advantages that C hilean MNEs have in ‘liberalisation know-how’. Chil e 
underwent liberalisation much earlier than other Latin American countries, and firm s were 
able to leverage this knowledge in other regional markets.   
The point that we are m aking here is this: The extent and intensity of EMNE activity is a 
function of their O advantages, which in turn are largely a function of their home country L 
advantages.  
Greater O advantages as EMNEs enter the second wave imply a gr eater breadth of activities. 
Such firms engage in m ore market-seeking, asset-exploiting activities in host countries, 
where not c oincidentally, competition is grea ter, and that implies a ge ographic shift in the 
emphasis of their activities. 
It is important to stress that asset-seeking activities increase as EMNEs evolve, along with a 
growing use of non-equity linkages with innova tion systems and firms abroad. However the 
extent (and the success) of such activity depends greatly on the possession of considerable Oa 
and Ot advantages. A certain th reshold of O advantages is requi red to efficiently internalise 
these activities. Such collaborative activity also presumes that EMNEs possess asse ts which 
they can augment, and which other firm s wish to acquire, because collaboration by  its very 
nature implies a two-way flow of knowledge. The concept of asset-augmentation implies that 
firms have existing ass ets which they wish to  augment. The foreign location is assum ed to 
provide access to L advantages th at are not as easily availabl e in the home location. In m any 
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cases the location advantages sought are associated with the presence of other firm s. If the 
EMNEs do not have som e superior ownership advantage it is unlik ely that th ey will be 
allowed to participate in innovation networ ks and alliances to acquire complementary 
resources from industry leaders if they have nothing to offer in  return (Narula 2006). It is 
important to note that asset-augm entation abroad requires a long-te rm view, because the 
benefits are rarely obvious in the short and medium run. Establishing links with suppliers , 
customers and potential collaborators takes year s to create. They are thus, by definition, 
expensive activities.  
This leads us to an obvious question:  is there evidence to indicate that this incremental path 
of upgrading sketched here no longer applies?  Has globalisation created a ‘new’ type of 
EMNE that do not broadly follow the princi ples described here?  Gammeltoft (2008) and 
Andreff (2003) have argued that  MNEs from the BRICs countries represent a ‘third wave’. 
We have argued and will demonstrate later that this simply represents an advanced version of 
the second wave. As EMNEs evolve and ac quire greater experience of international 
operations, competing directly with conve ntional MNEs, and managing cross-border 
activities, they naturally m ove closer to the structure and pattern s of the conventional 
(‘adult’) MNEs, displaying sim ilar ownership a dvantages, managerial skills, organisational 
structures and so forth.  Most importantly, they will have moved away from a dependence on 
location-bound O advantages. 
 
Globalisation as an important driver of the second wave MNEs 
It is essential to acknowledge that the grow th of EMNE activity sinc e the 1990s also reflects 
important exogenous and system ic changes in the organisation of econom ic activity. 
Specifically, the growth in EMN E activity re late to the process of liberalisation, the 
consequent increase in cross-border competition and the effect this has had on the structure of 
most emerging economies. Liberalisation has ha d a pervasive effect through an increasing 
outward orientation in most em erging economies due to domestic policy changes, as well as 
the trend towards econom ic integration through supranational agr eements and treaties.  This  
led to greater opportunities for conventional MN Es to penetrate hitherto sm aller markets 
through exports and FDI that were previously unattractive or unavailable to them.  
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Greater competition as a result of liberalisation meant that firms from these countries needed 
to upgrade their ownership advantages if they were to survive even in their home countries. 
This led to pressur e to seek asse ts abroad to augment their existing ass ets.  Those that were 
successful in such upgrading began simultaneously to seek markets abroad. Globalisation and 
its pursuant liberalisation have meant that firm s in all countries (whether developing or 
developed) now had potential access to larger markets. This has been aided by the growing 
complexity of products and se rvices (in that m ost now require a broader range of 
competences from different sectors), raising the costs of innovation, design and production 
(Narula and Dunning 2000). Providing similar products across larger de facto markets has 
also become essential to defray the costs and risks of such sunk costs, and firms need to have 
large economies of scale and a high er minimum efficient scale. This h as meant that firms in 
such industrial sectors need to expand internationally to justify the higher costs of innovation. 
In other words, firms increasingly need to  have competitive advantages that are globally 
viable, rather than dom estically or regionally so, and this has been further enhanced by the 
innovation of space-shrinking tech nologies, falling trade barriers,  and transportation costs 
(Narula and Dunning 2000).  Grow ing competition at home has meant that the privilege of 
slow and gradual building-up of ownership advantages through licensing and joint ventures is 
rarely an option. Nor were they able to continue to depend prim arily on obsolete production 
and process technologies (for which m arkets may still exist in countries at lower stages), but 
needed to simultaneously also seek to emulate best practice.  
Many developing econom ies had also nurture d state-owned enterprises and national 
champions as part of their econom ic and i ndustrial policies. They often also provided 
protection against competition, and subsidised their outward expansion (and this still remains 
the case in certain coun tries like China). Va rious agreements within the W TO (combined 
with economic liberalisation) have led to the dissolution – or at leas t a weakening of -such 
state support. This has paradoxically helped some  to improve their ownership advantages by 
providing them with the initial impetus to internationalise. Others have responded to the 
challenge by expanding abroad rapidly, and in  a more aggressive way. Greater competition 
has prompted other firms to upgrade their as sets by partnering with foreign MNEs, while 
others have sought to im prove their firm-specific assets through greater investment in R&D, 
whether at home or abroad. Firm s that have survived have tended to do so by following the 
same ‘game plan’ as ‘conventional’, MNEs in  the use of (and integration into) global 
production networks and supply chains.  As Cuervo-Cazurra and Stal (2010) note, pro-market 
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reforms have acted as an im portant push factor for the upgrading of the O advantages, going 
hand-in-hand with accelerated internationalisation.  Pananond (2007) highlights the changing 
dynamics of Thai MNEs after the Asian fi nancial crisis 1997. Wh ile the pre-crisis, 
international expansion relied m ore on networking capabilities rather than industry-specific 
technological capabilities, the post crisis adjustm ents of Thai MNEs displayed a different  
strategies which placed much m ore emphasis and commitment to development of industry-
specific technological capabilitie s as well as transform ing their personalized, relationship 
based networks to more transparent and formal ties. 
Indeed, as several case studi es have shown (e.g., Bonaglia  et al 2006., Goldstein 2008) 
accelerated internationalisation by EMNEs is certainly a primary feature of globalization, and 
as we a re unlikely to return to p rotected and isolated markets, something that needs to be 
acknowledged. Nonetheless, it is  worth cautioning that not all such accelerated activity is 
likely to be successful in the long run, and the success depends largely upon the extent to 
which such internationalisation reflects upgraded capabilities, rather than hubris. It is easy for 
firms to overestimate their O advantages and underestimate the liabili ty of foreignness and 
the costs of establishin g a presence abroad  Indeed, this is ref lected in the num ber of the 
‘early’ EMNEs in the  first wave that late r withdrew o r pared do wn their pr esence in 
developed markets. This is particularly so for those firms that relied on rents from protected 
home markets to subsidise their internationa l expansion. As competition at home increased 
post-liberalisation, there was considerable rest ructuring of their foreign operations, som e 
withdrawing from foreign markets others by paring down their foreign assets.  
Greater competition primarily from foreign entrants in the hom e market h as had several 
consequences for firm s that have hitherto ope rated in closed m arkets. Some of the m ore 
successful domestic firms were acquired (whe ther voluntarily or otherwise) by foreign 
investors (Humphrey et al 1998) while others have sought to upgrade their O advantages to 
compete more effectively, although the extent to  which firm s have be en aggressive about 
upgrading their technological cap abilities, products and servic es has varied considerably 
(Giuliani et al 2005, Morris and Barnes 2008).   
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It is also worth noting that the beginning of  the ‘second wave’ in the early 1990s coincided 
also with rising fears of protectionism in both Europe and the US7. This led to a large number 
of investments by non-US and non-European firms to establish facilities in these regions. The 
impression at the time was that both the US a nd Europe would discriminate against imported 
goods, with tariff and non-tariff re strictions on MNEs who were not engaged in value adding 
activity locally. These fears led to a much more rapid internationalisation of Korean, Chinese, 
Taiwanese and other second wave investors than might ordinarily have been the case.  
Nonetheless, as a considerable literature on the Asian NICs has demonstrated (Amsden 1989, 
Wade 1990, Lall 1996), the growth of the outward MNE activity m ainly reflects the astute  
use of industrial policy by their national govern ments upgrade their L advantages, along with 
quite considerable investments by firms to upgrade their firm-specific advantages. As we will 
discuss in the rest of the paper, with the possible exception of China, few of the em erging 
economies have consistently sought to do so.   
EMNE activity post-1993: a third wave or a continuation of the second wave?  
Although FDI data has several lim itations, it gives a reasonable basis for cross-country 
comparison and how changes have occurred  over tim e (Zhan 2006).  Em erging market 
outward FDI stocks as a percentage of total stock increased from 9.8 percent to 14.7 percent  
between 1993 and 2007 (see table 2). W hen the Asian NICs are excluded, however, we see a 
sudden drop in the outward FDI stock as a shar e of total world FDI stock, such that there  
seems little or no chang e in the tren d over the period from 6.4 percent to 6.97 percent over 
the same period, indicating that the m ajority of outward FDI from  developing countries 
originated from the Asian NICs. In other words,  these 4 cou ntries accounted for more than 
50% of all EMNE activity in 2007. Although the significance of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) increased fro m about 15% to approxim ately 20%, this  
increase is rather marginal.  As the se data are nominal, this implies a decline in real terms 
once we elim inate the NICs and B RICS (in othe r words, 9 countries) for the rest of the 
developing countries between 1993 and 2007 (table 3). Indeed, once we also exclude outward 
FDI stock from  the Middle East oil exporting economies and tax havens such as Virgin 
Islands, Cayman and Pa nama, outward FD I stocks from  emerging markets fell from 2.05 
percent to 0.44 percen t of the total between  1993 and 2007. This data suggests that EMNE 
                                                 
7 Many European countries introduced not-tariff barriers, and the c oncept of ‘Fortre ss Europe’ seemed a 
significant possibility. In the US, th e government imposed voluntary export restrictions on foreign firms if a 
certain threshold level of production was not undertaken in the US (Dunning 1993). 
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activity not a broad based phenomenon, but limited to a small group of countries. Indeed, the 
continued inclusion of the Asia n NICs in the classification of developing countries seem s 
somewhat problematic, given that the GDP leve l on a per capita basis (whether on a PPP or 
nominal basis) had by the end of the 1990s, had clearly converged with the developed world.  
***Table 3 here*** 
Table 2 gives details of the outward FDI st ock of the 20 largest hom e countries among the  
emerging market for 3 periods 1993, 2000 and 2007. There are no new countries in the list of 
the top 20 home countries (which excludes th e Middle East oil exporting econom ies and tax 
havens). These 20 countries accoun ted for 8.58 percent of total outward FDI in 1993, and in 
2007 these same countries accounted for 14.12 percent. As a percentage of outward FDI from 
the emerging markets as a whole, this figure is 87.85 percent and 96.31 percent for the years 
1993 and 2007 respectively. 
Table 2 als o lists the level of  outward FD I stock on a per capita basis. Despite the  
considerable focus on the growth  of outward FDI from India, its outward FDI stock on a per 
capita basis remains the lowest of the 20 countries in all three periods, having increased from 
just US$0.3 to US$25.1 over the 14 year period , and even in 2007 was less than countries 
such as the Philippines and Indonesia, and a third that of China, and is even lower than 
Nigeria and Columbia. The data for the BRICS countries in ge neral indicate that Brazil and 
South Africa were already major outward investors in 1993, and indeed may have declined in 
relative terms over time. It would seem, therefore, that the case of China and Russia were the 
only significant new entrants ove r this period. Consider also th at Russia presents a special 
case, having moved from being a  political s uperpower, with a stro ng military industrial 
complex to an “emerging economy”. Indeed, several indicators of technology and science in 
the 1980s ad 1990s make it difficult to argue the case that Russia’s development can usefully 
be compared with other so-called emerging economies, and continues to possess elem ents of 
a knowledge infrastructure which is very m uch “world class” (Nar ula and Jormanainen, 
2008), but have not fully m ade an effective transition which allow these assets to be 
efficiently exploited within a capitalist framework. 
The data in Table 3 indicates that the analyses conducted in  Dunning et al (1998) of the 
outward FDI activity from emerging economies continues to be relevant: it shows that growth 
in outward FDI activity has primarily been with a very small group of countries, that majority 
of whom which are at a level of developm ent consistent with a certain threshold level of L 
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advantages (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Na rula, 1996; Narula and Dunning, 2000, 2010). 
These are countries which are ordin arily associated with competitive advantages of domestic 
firms of the levels that could support sustainable growth of outward FDI (Narula, 2010). 
The data examined in table 2 and 3 indicate th at – once we exclude the NICs – the story of 
‘new’ outward investors from  the em erging economies is m ore a case of anecdote than 
concrete evidence. On a firm -level analysis, 40% of the top 100 non-financial EMNEs  
published by UNCTAD (2010) were from  the As ian NICs .Table 4 shows the industrial 
specialisation of these firms. Although the data provided on  the industrial specialisation of  
the 59 non-NICs EMNEs is som ewhat general, a bout half can be described as first wave 
MNEs, engaged in natural resource-intensive/ext ractive sectors or in sectors which require 
access to such natural resources (such as metals and m etal products, wood and paper 
products, petroleum, mining).  As table 4 show s, of the 28 largest BRICS MNEs, 57% are in 
primary-based sectors. This contrasts with th e NICs MNEs, where the m ajority are engaged 
in the manufacturing sector.  
 
***Table 4 here*** 
What does seem rather clear from table 4 is that the industrial structure of outward activity by 
the NICs M NEs is clearly different from  the BRICS countries.  By and larg e, the NICs  
MNES reflect the industrial st ructure of their hom e countries, which tends to be in the 
manufacturing sector, and m ore specifically, in the more innovation-driven, Schumpeterian 
sectors of the economy. As one might expect from their shift in the late 1980s away from first 
wave, infant MNE behaviour, they have cont inued to m ove away from  primary-based 
industries and towards high-valu e adding activity. No sim ilar shift can be observed in the 
BRICS countries. 
A large percentage of these BRICS firm s across all sectors and countries  are state-owned or 
state-controlled (almost all the Chinese MN Es in this list, Petrobras, Gazprom, ONGC  
Videsh), or have significant ties to national governments as national champions. Indeed, state 
support for outward FDI activities is a significant  issue that deserves to be m ore clearly 
highlighted. Firms that enjoy stat e-support, whether due to state ownership or as a result of 
prior or current national cham pion status tend to  benefit from lower cost of  capital and state 
guarantees, and are considered to be ‘too bi g to fail’ (Buckley et al, 2007, Huang, 2008). 
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They are therefore able to sustain poorly performing foreign operations for a longer period, 
unlike most privately owned firm s, and also benefit from a range of supportive governm ent 
policies to promote their internationalisation (Giroud et al., 2009, Fortainer and van Tulder 
2009, Kumar and Chadha, 2009). Sim ilar claims are also m ade for family business groups, 
which do not have to justify underperforming investments to shareholders (Hemrit 2011).  
It is worth noting that not all EMNE activity represents de facto FDI, in the sense that it is not 
always undertaken with intention of explo iting the benefits of comm on ownership.  
Motivations can also represent a situation where the foreign investment is de facto a portfolio 
engagement seeking a higher rate of return. One of the reasons m any developing countries 
discouraged outward FDI prior to liberalisation was that outward activity rep resented an 
excuse for capital flight. This m otivation cannot be discounted. Morck et al (2008) note that 
this remains an important reason for some percentage of Chinese outward investment. Indeed, 
the role of round-tripping rem ains a signi ficant phenomenon for Chinese outward FDI 
(Sutherland et al 2010). In the case of Ru ssia, high levels of political and econom ic 
uncertainty as well as considerable regulatory constraints after the co llapse of the Soviet 
Union resulted in considerable capital fli ght (Kalotay 2002). Child and Rodriguez (2005) 
have noted that Chinese firm s may pursue outward FDI as a m eans to m inimise 
disadvantages of having a purely domestic footprint. Witt and Lewin (2007) similarly suggest 
outward FDI may also be a m eans to exit institutional constraints at home. Lastly, cash-rich 
firms from emerging economies (and this includes the oil-rich economies of the Middle East) 
have a propensity to acquire co mpanies that provide some prestige can best be described as 
‘trophy FDI’ for which the objective is larg ely non-commercial (Globerman and Shapiro 
2009). While enhancing the investor’s reputation, they make little economic sense. Child and 
Rodrigues (2005) argue that a c onsiderable share of Chinese outward FDI is driven by the 
government’s mandate to enhance China’s econo mic and political power in the world and 
expand China’s international trade relations, rather than the goal of economic returns. 
Even where the intention is not to engage in foreign ownership as a hands-off portfolio of 
companies, this does n ot mean that EMNEs always posses s the cap acity to in tegrate and 
manage them successfully, and reap the bene fit of the econom ies of comm on governance. 
Tata’s acquisition of both Tetley’s and Jaguar L and Rover have both been loosely integrated 
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(if at all) with the Tata’s other ope rations either at hom e or elsewhere8.  Where such firms 
have sought to integrate m ore deeply, the lack of experience in m anaging cross-border 
activities is reflected in their f ailure to r eap scale econ omies. Acquisitions rather than 
greenfield activities have the advantage of rapi dity, but require greater ownership advantages 
to maintain. On the other hand, acquired assets are easier to divest since they continue to have 
a resale value, should they have a change in strategic direction (Athreye and Kapur 2009).   
The role of L advantages in creating successful EMNEs 
Let us turn  to exam ine some data that revea l the na ture of the L advantages o f home 
countries. Table 5 lists the outward FDI positio n of a variety of different countries, listed by  
their GDP per capita. For each group of countries, and for a number of variables that give us 
a good idea of their basic and advanced infrastructure. Below each group, we take an average 
of the group of countries and indicate its rela tive level compared with the notional frontier – 
that of a group of industrialised  economies.  The intention here  is to gauge how close these 
developing countries are relati ve to the lead group, whose MN Es are dominant players and 
are at the frontier in terms of O advantages.  
For instance, in term s of outward F DI, emerging countries (China, India, Brazil, A rgentina, 
Malaysia, Chile) are at 7% of th e stock level of the industrialised countries listed in Table 5, 
while the 3 NICs countries list ed are roughly double that.  Ind eed, these variables indicate  
that both in term s of basic inf rastructure (electricity consum ption) and knowledge 
infrastructure, on almost every measure, (except the number of scientific journal articles), the 
emerging country group are at about half the level (or less) of the Asian NICs, which are 
themselves considerably lower than the industrialised country group.  
***Table 5 here*** 
 
The last three colum ns in table 5 exam ine the ICT sector im ports and exports of these 
countries, and by taking a ratio of these num bers, provides us with a m easure of the 
comparative advantage of these countries in the ICT sector.  This data is taken here as an 
indicator of the structure of the econom y. Broadly speaking, most e merging countries have 
                                                 
8 The failure of Tata to create sufficient firm-specific advantages, or upgrade their domestic capacity despite this 
large takeover is telling. Tata Nano – much vaunted as a success story of upgrading - has proven to be a flop 
even in the Indian m arket due to its  technical shortcomings. The Financial Times reports that Tata Nano was 
selling rather fewer cars that Mercedes in India by the end of 2010 (FT December 7 2010) 
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targeted the ICT sector as a means to leapfrog and move towards more high tech, high value 
adding activity. Thus, a com parative advantage in ICT is a good indication of a country’s 
long-term competitiveness, and also indicates the propensity of its firms to possess significant 
Oa advantages. This data indicates that very few emerging or developing countries – with the 
exception of China and Malaysia - are competitive in ICT sectors.  
These results indicate a very low level of adva nced infrastructure in China and India, and a  
wide disparity between the two countries. China has 10 times as many researchers per million 
than India, but China is  itself four times less than that of Korea (which  on this indicator is 
marginally lower than japan, but higher than most EU countries).   
***Table 6 here*** 
 
Table 6 provides another set of indicators for a smaller set of countries (Due to data 
limitations). The first two colum ns set out data  on patenting.  Column 2 gives US patents 
granted by country Indian and Chinese firms increased their patenting activity since 1990, but 
India has half the patenting level of China, 15 times less than Korea and 20 tim es less than 
Taiwan in 2002.  Column 3 gives the share of  high-tech valued added of each economy. The 
data indicates that Ind ia is half that Malaysia, which is less than 10% th at of China. Chin’s 
high tech value added is twice that of Korea,  and four tim es that of Singapore or Taiwan 
(which are admittedly much smaller economies).  
L advantages are also the primary determinant of inward FDI, and the extent and nature of a 
country’s inward FDI stock is indicative of the quality of the location advantages.  Using data 
for US MNEs in vario us countries in Table 6, the relatively strong p osition of the NICs 
compared to the emerging countries is again underlined.  
 
Conclusions and implications 
This paper has sifted through the literature and empirical evidence on EMNEs, arguing that 
this is no t necessarily new. In deed, firms from emerging countries have been 
inetrnationalising since at least the Second World War (UN 1993), others earlier – Tata & Co 
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had offices in Hong Kong as early as the 1880s to  facilitate their trading activities in China 9.  
The early literature had shown that there were in fact two types of EMNEs: those that were 
infant ‘first wave’ MNEs that were engaged in  relatively low value-adding activity that was 
primarily trade-supportive or resource-seeking in other developing countries, reflecting the L 
advantages and com petitiveness of their hom e countries. A second set, defined as ‘second 
wave’ or adolescent MNEs – most often the sam e companies that had upgraded their 
capabilities – were seen to m ove towards market-seeking FDI in developed countries, again 
reflecting the evolving comparative and competitive advantages of their home countries.  We 
have made the point that these ‘waves’ exist simultaneously, and are not exclusive. That is, as 
firms garner greater international ex perience and improving stock of ownership advantages 
(both transaction – and asset-type), it is na tural for them to m ove towards seco nd wave 
behaviour, and eventually will become indistinguishable from conventional or mature MNEs.  
By and large, evidence from the last decade shows the same continuing trends. The industrial 
specialisation of EMNEs contin ues to reflect the industrial structure and com parative and 
competitive advantage of their home countries. For instance, it is clear that the specialisation 
of MNEs fro m the NICs di ffers from t he BRICS, and the rela tive levels of FDI activ ity 
reflect the differences in their home country L advantages.  It is also  clear that the d efinition 
of emerging economy is excessively broad – th e majority of EMNE activ ity is a ssociated 
with the Asian NICs and the BRICS, the form er technically no longer ‘em erging’. If 
countries such as India and China are som e distance away from catching up with the Asian 
NICs in terms of L advantages, it is  also not surprising to see that their MNEs are also some 
way off in term s of internationalisation of firm-specific advantages, and that so few 
significant home countries exist outside the BRICS.  
It is im portant to acknowledge that there are important structural ch anges associated with 
globalisation and a consequent growth in the rapidity with wh ich firms seek to  
internationalise. EMNEs were exposed to greater competition with liberalisation, and this has 
meant that surviving in the l onger run they have needed be  more aggressive about the 
upgrading of their firm -specific assets and one means to do so is by  internationalisation. 
However, we can also expect that a number of these EMNEs will not prove able to survive in 
a globalised world where they m ust compete with ‘conventional’ MNEs which have greater 
experience and managerial know-how of m anaging across borders and achieving econom ies 
                                                 
9 http://www.legco.gov.hk/1886-87/h870325.pdf 
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of common governance. It is highly improbable to expect a country with lim ited location 
advantages to spawn a large number of internationally competitive firms, which then have the 
managerial, entrepreneurial and organisational capacity to enga ge in complex organisational  
modes in foreign markets.  
As to the idea that O advantages can be ac quired through astute use of reverse knowledge 
transfer through allian ces, networks and production netw orks this goes against the well-
known principle that ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’ . More advanced firm s do not 
share assets unless there is a clear basis  for exchange. Even where EMNEs possess the 
relevant O advantage s with which  to trade  assets with m ore advanced MNEs, the y must 
possess the necessary O advantages (absorptive capabilities) to internalise the acquired assets. 
Once internalised, they need to possess the app ropriate organisational and managerial skills 
to transfer them intra-firm to other subsidia ries at home or abroad (Narula 2010).  Such an 
extensive laundry list of O adva ntages is not assim ilated overnight.  There is also an 
important adage that is not as well-known, but applies equa lly well here: ‘j ust because you 
can buy a car, does not m ean you can drive it’.  Indeed, the fact that few of the second wave  
MNEs outside the NICs have managed to move towards innovation-driven activities indicates 
how difficult this is.  
Leapfrogging through outward FDI requires firm-specific assets in innovation-driven sectors, 
and these derive from the home country’s L advantages. There are no exceptions to this rule. 
Competitive industries – and by th is we m ean more than an occas ional exception – are 
associated with hom e countries w hich are th emselves competitive. Japan, Korea, Taiwan 
have all bu ilt up globally competitive firms by the as tute use of  industrial policy and 
investment in public goods. Malaysia, India China and Brazil have done so as well, although 
perhaps not equally well. As the data examined here has shown, China’s L and O advantages 
are much more advanced than India’s, and th ese weaknesses reflect them selves also in the  
success of their MNEs.  To be sure, globalisat ion – and specifically ag reements associated 
with the WTO – has opened up new industries to international competition, particularly in the 
services and tertiary sector. India’s international competitive position in sof tware and 
business process outsourcing owes much to liber alisation.  However, these sectors are also 
dependent on location-bound O advantages – particularly access to skilled (but lo w paid) 
English speaking workers.  
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It is not clear th at EMNEs present a new a nd alternative channel for capital flows and 
knowledge flows for host developing countries. First wave MNEs may prefer to invest in less 
developed countries in low value added m anufacturing or natural resource extracting sectors. 
However, these activities do not provide opportunities for significant knowledge transfers and 
on the whole cannot be expected to provide significant spillovers and linkages.  
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Table 1: Characteristics of three types of emerging market MNEs 
 “First wave”   
 
“Second wave”  “Second 
wave+” 
(2000s) 
“Conventional MNEs” 
Ramamurti 
terminology 
“Infant MNEs” “Adolescent MNEs”  “Mature MNEs” 
Destination Regional FDI: 
neighbouring countries 
and other developing 
countries 
Majority still regional, 
but expanding to a global 
basis 
 Global basis 
Motivation Resource seeking, market 
seeking in developing 
countries 
In developing countries: 
resource and mark 
seeking 
In industrialized 
countries: asset seeking 
and market seeking 
 Efficiency seeking: 
MNE motivation aimed 
at optimizing use of 
each country’s 
comparative and 
competitive advantages 
Type of 
outward 
FDI 
In developing countries: 
natural asset intensive, 
small scale production in 
light industries 
(Hecksher-Ohlin, moving 
towards undifferentiated 
Smithian industries) 
In developing countries: 
natural asset intensive 
sectors as in first wave 
In industrialized 
countries: (a) assembly 
type, market seeking FDI 
primarily in Smithian 
industries (b) asset 
seeking investment in 
Schumpeterian industries 
In between 
second wave 
and 
conventional 
MNEs 
Capital and knowledge 
intensive 
(Schumpetrian) sectors 
capital/labour ratio 
dependent on natural/ 
created asset of host 
countries 
Ownership 
advantages 
Primarily country-of-
specific. Fundamental Oa 
advantages, few Ot 
advantages 
Both firm and country 
specific. Improving Oa 
advantages, Ot 
advanatges still basic 
 Mainly firms specific 
Advanced Oa and Ot 
advantages 
Examples 
of 
ownership 
advantages 
Conglomerate group 
ownership 
Technology (most 
adapted) 
Management adapted to 
emerging country 
conditions 
Low cost inputs 
(including managerial and 
technical personnel) 
“Ethnic” advantages 
Conglomerate group 
ownership 
Management adapted to 
emerging country 
conditions 
Low cost inputs 
(including managerial 
and technical personnel) 
“Ethnic” advantages 
Some product 
differentiation 
Limited marketing skills 
Vertical control over 
factor/ product markets 
Subsidized capital 
 Large size – economies 
of scale 
Access to capital 
markets 
Technology 
Product differentiation 
Marketing know how 
Cross country 
management skills 
Globally efficient intra-
firm activities 
Vertical control over 
factor/ product markets 
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Table 2: Emerging market outward FDI (as a percentage of world outward FDI stock) 
 1993 2000 2007 
All developing countries (DC) 9.77 14.02 14.66 
All DCs less BRICs 7.18 12.36 11.39 
All DCs. less NICs 6.42 6.61 6.97 
All DCs. Less BRICs and NICs 3.02 3.60 2.42 
All DCs. Less BRICs, NICs & GCCs 2.65 3.43 1.89 
All DCs less BRICs, NIC s, GCCs, 
Virgin Islands, Cayn an Islands & 
Panama 
2.05 1.83 0.44 
Sources: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 1993, 2000, 2007. 
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Table 3: Outward FDI of 20 largest emerging markets (excluding GCC countries and 
tax havens) 
 
Sources:  
1. UNCTAD major FDI indicators (World Investment Reportr, 2008). 
http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx 
2. World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009 Edition. IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys. 
  
1993 2000 2007
Home country OFDI stock OFDI stock per capita OFDI stock OFDI stock per capita OFDI stock OFDI stock per capita
US$ Million Rank US$ Million Rank US$ Million Rank US$ Million Rank US$ Million Rank US$ Million Rank
Brazil 42,688          1 277.2            5 51,946          4 303.0             10 129,840          5 685.8              9
Hong Kong 3,911            2 6,521.2         1 388,380        1 57,863.0        1 1,026,587       1 147,646.6       1
Taiwan 36,989          3 1,761.8         3 66,655          2 2,992.1          3 15,836            3 6,897.9           3
South Africa 17,952          4 456.3            4 32,333          5 726.2             5 54,562            9 1,140.3           7
China 13,768          5 11.6              18 27,768          6 21.9               19 95,799            6 72.5                17
Singapore 13,209          6 3,984.6         2 56,766          3 14,093.0        2 149,526          4 32,583.5         2
Argentina 8,085            7 238.4            6 21,141          8 574.7             7 26,873            13 682.8              10
Korea 5,441            8 123.1            7 26,833          7 570.8             8 66,220            7 1,366.6           8
Mexico 3,386            9 38.5              11 8,273            12 84.5               11 44,703            10 424.7              12
Venezuela 2,447            10 117.0            8 7,676            13 317.5             9 13,814            15 502.3              11
Nigeria 2,411            11 24.5              12 4,132            15 34.7               15 5,514              20 38.3                19
Russia 2,300            12 15.5              16 20,141          9 137.1             12 255,211          2 1,794.7           6
Malaysia 1,437            13 73.5              10 15,878          10 675.8             6 58,175            8 21,674.0         4
Indonesia 1,294            14 6.8                19 6,940            14 33.8               17 21,426            14 95.3                16
Turkey 1,263            15 22.7              13 3,668            16 58.4               14 12,210            16 177.2              14
Chile 1,111            16 80.7              9 11,154          11 733.3             4 32,469            11 1,957.9           5
Thailand 960               17 16.5              14 2,203            18 35.3               16 7,025              18 106.9              15
Philippines 908               18 13.8              17 2,044            19 26.8               18 5,573              19 62.9                18
Columbia 591               19 15.9              15 2,989            17 70.6               13 10,383            17 218.5              13
India 294               20 0.3                20 1,859            20 1.8                 20 29,412            12 25.1                20
1993 2000 2007
Sum of 20 DCs' OFDI 160,445.0     760,779.0     2,063,165       
Share of all DCs's OFDI 87.85            88.04            96.31              
Share of world's OFDI 8.58              12.34            14.12              
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Table 4: industrial distribution of top 100 non-finacial TNCs from emerging economies, 2008 
Industries NICs BRICS Other emerging
Manufacturing
Electrical and electronic equipments 13 1
Food, beverages and tobacco, other consumer goods 5 2
Other equipment goods 4
Chemicals 1 1
Motor vehicles 1 1
Other consumer goods 1 5
Pharmaceuticals 1
Wood and paper products 1
Subtotal 24 3 10
Primary-based
Metals and metal products 2 9 2
Petroleum expl./ref./distr. 1 6 3
Mining & quarrying 1
Non-metalic mineral products 1
Subtotal 3 16 6
Services
Investment holding (diversified) 6 3 3
Transport and storage 3 1
Wholesale trade 2 1
Construction; construction and real estate 3 2
Business services 1
Telecommunications 1 1 8
Utilities (Electricity, gas and water) 1 2
Subtotal 14 9 15
Total 41 28 31
Source: Adapted from The top 100 list  non-financial MNEs from developing and transition
economies, World Investment Report, UNCTAD, 2010
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outward FDI stock 2009 
 Electric power 
consumption 
(Kwh per 
capita) 
School 
enrolment 
tertiary (% 
gross)
Researchers 
in R&D (per 
million pop) 
Scientific and 
technical 
journal articles 
Internet
users (per 
100 
people)
ICT goods 
import ($
million) 
ICT goods 
export ($ 
million)
ICT 
comparative 
advantage 
Export/ 
Import
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Peru 1880 961   35  153 25 22
Venezuela 17670 3,077   497.2 26 5231 40 0.01
Nigeria 6438 137   427 16 2872 2 0.00
Pakistan 2201 474   5  741 11 2476 95 0.04
Vietnam 0 728   283 24 5751 3439 0.60
 Average 5,638  1,075   20  420 20 4114 1767 0.43As % of developed 
countries 0.5% 10% 28% 2% 25% 8% 3%
EMERGING COUNTRIES
China 229660 2,332   22  1,071  56,806 23 306156 430728 1.41
India 77207 542   14  137  18,194 5 15901 2375 0.15
Malaysia 75618 3,667   32  808 56 39479 52060 1.32
Brazil 157667 2,171   30  11,885 38 20525 3601 0.18
Argentina 29428 2,659   68  980  3,362 28 5586 335 0.06
Chile 41203 3,318   52  1,740 33 3842 111 0.03
 Average 87,255  2,448   36  547  15,466 30 65248 81535 1.25As % of developed 
countries 7% 22% 52% 13% 61% 38% 122% 156%
NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Korea, Rep 115620 8,502.0   96.1 4,627.20 18,467.20 75.8 58,614   115,625 1.97
Singapore 213110 8,513.7   6,087.90 3,792.30 69.6 90,279   122,991 1.36
Hong Kong 834039 5,899.2   34.3 67 164,686  158,672 0.96
 Average 188,665  7,638.30   65.20  5,357.55  11,129.75 72.70  104,526.33   132,429.33 1.27As % of developed 
countries 16% 68% 93% 123% 44% 90% 196% 253%
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
United States 4302851 13,638   82  209,695 75.8 287469 174865 0.61
Japan 740930 8,474   58  5,573  52,896 75.2 84206 115239 1.37
Denmark 216176 6,670   80  5,431  5,236 83.3 9631 6067 0.63
Germany 1378480 7,184   3,453  44,408 75.5 113190 111704 0.99
Netherlands 850554 7,097   60  2,680  14,210 87.0  70996 73858 1.04
Norway 164693 24,980   76  5,247  4,079 82.5 8047 3341 0.42
Sweden 367358 15,238   75  5,215  9,914 87.7 18377 18630 1.01
United Kingdom 1651727 6,123   59  2,881  47,121 76 69457 37806 0.54
 Average 1,209,096  11,176   70  4,354  25,409 80.4  53415 52378 0.98
b. Scientific and technical journal articles, World Development Indicators, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
Human development indicator, United nations Development Programme (UNDP),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_EN_Indicator_tables.pdf
c. Internet users (per 100 people), 2007. World Development Indicators, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
d. Time to prepare and pay tax (hours), 2007. World Development Indicators, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator
f ICT d i t d t ($ illi ) 2009 I f ti R t 2010 U it d N ti N Y k d G 2010
Table 5: indicators of L advantages 
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US patents granted Hi-tech industry value added R&D by US MNEs Value added by US MNEs Science, engineering doctorate
1990 2002
% 
change 1990 2002 % change 2007 2008
% 
change 2007 2008
% 
change  All S&E  Engineering G G
ECONOMIES
China 99           522 36%        9,224      86,770 70%        1,173        1,517 29%      21,438      27,296 27%                  12,238                   6,573 
India 23           249 82%        1,401        4,076 16%           382           582 52%        7,375        9,363 27%                    6,318                      779 
Malaysia 3             55 144%        2,025      10,795 36%           390           360 -8%        7,826      10,886 39%
 Average         42          275       4,217     33,880          523          667     11,964     17,927                  9,278                 3,676 
As % of developed 
countries 0.10% 0.36% 2.85% 10.97% 4.49% 5.41% 4.20% 6.12% 36.43% 53.93%
NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALIZED 
COUNTRIES
Korea, Republic of 225        3,786 132%      10,959      41,652 23%           928           966 4%      12,153      10,472 -14%                    3,192                   1,868 
Singapore 12           410 276%        8,150      19,524 12%           549           621 13%      19,476      20,125 3%
Taiwan 732        5,431 53%        9,418      24,524 13%             97           102 5%        6,566        6,985 6%                    1,167                      656 
 Average       323       3,209       9,509     28,567          417          448     12,717     12,360                  2,180                 1,262 
As % of developed 
countries 0.76% 4.20% 6.44% 9.25% 3.58% 3.63% 4.46% 4.22% 8.56% 18.51%O
COUNTRIES
United States    90,365    167,334 7%    147,061    482,836 19%                  26,891                   5,265 
Japan    19,525      34,859 7%    148,350    134,610 -1%        1,919        1,872 -2%      39,771      44,094 11%                    7,581                   3,921 
Europe    17,640      26,960 4%      21,365      22,803 7%    530,490    541,528 2%                  41,939                 11,263 
 Average   42,510     76,384    147,706    308,723      11,642      12,338    285,131    292,811                 25,470                  6,816 
As % of developed 
countries 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Sources
a. Triad patent families: Organization for Economic and Development (OECD), World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int
Notes: A triad patent family is formed when patent applications for same invention is filed in Europe, Japan and United States. 
b. US patents granted: US, PTO, Office of Electronic Information Products, Patent Technology Monitoring Division, special tabulations
c. Hi-tech industry value added: Global Insight, Inc., World Industry Service Database (2005). Historical data from United Nations (UN) Industrial Development Organization; UN Statistics Division, S
d. R&D by US MNEs: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for US MNEs (annual series)
e. Value added by US MNEs: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Direct Investment Abroad: Financial and Operating Data for US MNEs (annual series)
f. Science and engineering doctorate production, ard, Science and Engineering Indicators 2006, Volume 2, NSB 06-01A (2006), appendix tables 2-42 and 2-43; OECD Education database
g,h.i Fixed telephone lines, mobile subscribers, internet users (per 100 people): Information Economy Report 2010: ICT, Enterprises and Proverty Alleviation, United Nations, 2010
Table 6: Indicators L and O advantages
The UNU‐MERIT WORKING Paper Series 
 
2011-01 Mitigating  'anticommons' harms to research  in science and technology by Paul A. 
David 
2011-02 Telemedicine  and  primary  health:  the  virtual  doctor  project  Zambia  by  Evans 
Mupela, Paul Mustard and Huw Jones 
2011-03 Russia's  emerging multinational  companies amidst  the global  economic  crisis by 
Sergey Filippov 
2011-04 Assessment of Gender Gap in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-05 Assessment  of  Effectiveness  of  China Aid  in  Financing Development  in  Sudan  by 
Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-06 Assessment  of  the  Impacts  of  Oil:  Opportunities  and  Challenges  for  Economic 
Development in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-07 Labour Market and Unemployment in Sudan by Samia Satti Osman Mohamed Nour 
2011-08 Social impacts of the development of science, technology and innovation indicators 
by Fred Gault 
2011-09 User innovation and the market by Fred Gault 
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